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Abstract. The present contribution discusses the latest ruling of the European Court of 
Justice in the case of Google, which may have deeper consequences for advertisers relying on 
AdWords service, as well as for providers of similar services around the globe. The Court ruling 
may turn out to be even more important for Web 2.0 service providers as it seems to have opened 
the possibility of applying for a legal protection under Article 14 of the Ecommerce Directive. 
European judges made it clear that sponsored links services are information society services and 
that they may fall under the sphere of application of hosting safe haven provided that their 
activities are of technical, automatic and passive nature understood as a lack of knowledge or 
control over the data stored. This statement is yet to be applied by French courts that will have to 




Google search engine produces two sets of results: natural search results, which are an outcome of indexation of 
billions of pages and their presentation based on sorting according to the PageRank™ algorithm, as well as 
sponsored results, that are an outcome of an automated process of displaying an advertisement associated with a 
sought phrase.1 The former service is better known as AdWords, and allows advertisers to display links to their 
pages, irrespective of the natural results of the query. Advertisers pay Google for the display of their ads on a 
‘Price-per-Click’ basis, every time a user clicks on a displayed link. If several advertisers select the same 
keyword, their position on a sponsored hit list will be dependent upon the basis of the highest price, the amount 
of earlier clicks on a given link and the quality of a commercial communication from the Google's perspective 
(Google case, para. 26).  
 
Since advertisers select themselves keywords, triggering the display of sponsored links and Google does not 
intervene during the keyword selection phase, it is possible that third party rights may be infringed, particularly 
when selected phrases are identical or correspond to protected trademarks (Polanski 2009). And it was the main 
theme of a long battle between French trademark holders, who claimed that both Google AdWords service, as 
well as advertisers using their service infringes the law.  
 
There are three cases, which were referred to the ECJ from the French Cour de Cassation, and which were 
joined together by the European Court. In the case of Louis Vuitton (case C-236/08),  the reputable trademark 
holder called into question the legality of display practices where a ‘Louis Vuitton’ keyword entered into Google 
search engine triggers a display of sponsored links leading to sites offering counterfeit products. It is worth 
stressing that Google has not blocked the possibility of selecting keywords denoting counterfeit such as ‘copy’ or  
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‘replica’. As a result, Google was found guilty of trademark infringement. The Cour de Cassation stayed the 
proceedings and referred three questions to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling. The first question concerned the 
legality of Google’s keyword selection practices, particularly with respect to counterfeit products, in the light of 
Community Regulation 40/94 and the Directive 89/104. The second question concerned the interpretation of 
Community trade mark secondary law as to the permissibility of such practices with respect to trade marks that 
have reputation. The third question concerned the interpretation of the directive on electronic commerce and the 
application of hosting exemption to AdWords services. 
 
The second case concerned a usage of marks ‘bourse des vols’, ‘bourse des voyages’ and ‘BDV’ in a Google 
search engine (case C-237/08). This case differed in relation to the previous one as the products sold on the 
advertised sites did not infringe the trademarks of Viaticum and Luteciel. Despite the fact that AdWords service 
offered links to identical or similar products, Google was found guilty of trade mark infringement, and on 
appeal, of being an accessory to trade mark infringement (Google opinion, para. 23). The questions referred to 
the ECJ for a preliminary ruling were similar to the first and the last question in the previous case. 
 
The third case concerned the French trade mark ‘Eurochallenges’ (case C-238/08). As in the second case, its 
usage in the query led to the display of ads for sites offering identical or similar products. Similar to the previous 
litigation, the Google search engine, among other defendants, was found guilty of trade mark infringement. 
When the case reached the Cour de Cassation three questions were referred to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling. 
The first question was novel as it concerned the possibility of a trade mark infringement consisting in the act of 
selecting for advertising purposes a keyword which corresponds to the trade mark. The second and third question 
corresponded to two questions referred to in the previous case.  
 
In all of the cases the last question concerned whether Article 14 liability exemption for hosting applies to 
the content featured by Google in AdWords, which is the main topic of this contribution.  The aim of this paper 
is to focus on the impact of the ruling of the ECJ on the availability of hosting exemption to search engine 
service providers, as well as Web 2.0 content providers. The analysis will start with a brief presentation of the 
background information, especially the Advocate General's Opinion. Then a detailed analysis of Google 
Judgment dealing with a hosting exemption will be presented.  
2. Background  
 
Before we delve into the analysis of the interpretation of hosting exemption to AdWords service,  it is worth 
briefly discussing the first three out of four answers proposed by  Advocate General Poiares Maduro in his 
Opinion issued on 22nd September 2009 (Google opinion).  
 
The first question concerned the potential liability of an advertiser who, without the authorization, uses 
keywords, which correspond to a trademark registered by trademark proprietor. The Advocate General argued 
that the advertiser who uses a keyword corresponding to a trademark does not commit an infringement: 
 
 "...the display of a link proposing connection to a site operated by that economic operator for 
the purposes of offering for sale goods or services, and which reproduces or imitates a trade 
mark registered by a third party and covering identical or similar goods, without the 
authorisation of the proprietor of that trade mark, does not constitute in itself an infringement 
of the exclusive right...".  
 
As a result, in the Advocate's General view, advertisers are free to use whatever keywords they deem 
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 "... must be interpreted as meaning that the proprietor of a trade mark is entitled to prohibit an 
advertiser from advertising, on the basis of a keyword identical with that trade mark which that 
advertiser has, without the consent of the proprietor, selected in connection with an internet 
referencing service, goods or services identical with those for which that mark is registered, in 
the case where that advertisement does not enable an average internet user, or enables that user 
only with difficulty, to ascertain whether the goods or services referred to therein originate from  
the proprietor of the trade mark or an undertaking economically connected to it or, on the 
contrary, originate from a third party."  
 
As a result, trademark proprietors received a strong backing from the Court against advertisers, who rely on 
keywords identical with trademarks, provided that a trademark owner can demonstrate the potential confusion 
that an advertisement might cause among Internet users. The basic problem that arises in this context is how an 
advertiser should formulate an advertisement so as not to misguide an Internet user as to the origin of a given 
product or service. Average users, could be argued, are already accustomed to recognizing the "original" source 
of products or services based on the domain name address, which is always presented on a sponsored hit list. On 
the other hand, the Court clearly expects more in such cases, which may lead to a successful blocking of 
advertisements by rightholders who now may object the usage of keywords identical with trademarks. 
 
The second question concerned the liability of Google for contribution to the trademark infringement. The 
AG argued that a trademark proprietor cannot prevent the search engine operator from making available to the 
advertisers keywords corresponding to trademarks nor  
 
"....from arranging under the referencing agreement for advertising links to sites to be created 
and favourably displayed, on the basis of those keywords." The Court seems to have followed 
this suggestion and ruled that: "An internet referencing service provider which stores, as a 
keyword, a sign identical with a trade mark and organises the display of advertisements on the 
basis of that keyword does not use that sign within the meaning of Article 5(1) and (2) of 
Directive 89/104 or of Article 9(1) of Regulation No 40/94."  
 
As a result Google and other search engine service providers seem to have won an assurance that the paid 
referencing service they provide does not in itself infringe trademark laws. The same reasoning was applied in 
the third question, which dealt with trademarks that have a reputation.  
 
In summary, advertisers themselves rather than sponsored links service providers risk the collision with 
trademarks laws when they use keywords identical with trademarks in a way that may confuse Internet users.  
3. Liability for hosting AdWords content under article 14 of the Ecommerce Directive 
 
The last question posed by Cour de Cassation in all the three cases referred to the ECJ is whether Article 14 of 
Directive 2000/31 is to be interpreted to mean that a sponsored links service 
 
 "...constitutes an information society service consisting in the storage of information supplied 
by the advertiser, with the result that that information is the subject of ‘hosting’ within the 
meaning of that article and that the referencing service provider therefore cannot be held liable 
prior to its being informed of the unlawful conduct of that advertiser" (Google case, para. 106). 
 
 In other words, the referring court has doubts whether Google AdWords service can be considered as 
consisting of storage of information. These doubts are indirectly a consequence of the fact that European  
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legislation has not followed an American approach and has not devised a distinct liability exemption for search 
engine service providers. One should note, however, that at least Portugal, Spain, Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, 
Romania and Liechtenstein have adopted some form of limitation of liability for location tool or hyperlinking 
services (Walden, 2009). 
 
The answer to this question is not only important for search engine service providers but for all kind of 
service providers that store digital content at the request of a user (i.e. user-generated content service providers 
or Web 2.0 services). If Article 14 of the directive is construed narrowly then such services will not be covered 
by the hosting exemption. On the other hand, if a wider interpretation prevails, then Web 2.0 services as well as 
search engines might find a safe haven despite a lack of explicit regulation of search engine liability in the 
directive on electronic commerce.  
 
Paragraph 1 of Article 14 of the Directive 2000/31/EC titled "Hosting" reads as follows:  
 
"Where an information society service is provided that consists of the storage of information 
provided by a recipient of the service, Member States shall ensure that the service provider is 
not liable for the information stored at the request of a recipient of the service, on condition 
that:  
(a) the provider does not have actual knowledge of illegal activity or information and, as 
regards claims for damages, is not aware of facts or circumstances from which the illegal 
activity or information is apparent; or  
(b) the provider, upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to remove 
or to disable access to the information." 
 
The aforementioned exemption covers both criminal and civil charges "for all types of illegal activities 
initiated by third parties." ((COM(2003) 702 final (21.11.2003), para 4.6) Consequently, Google could be 
exempt from liability for all types of illegal activities, including trademark infringement, initiated by its users 
provided that certain conditions were fulfilled. Article 14 hosting exemption applies where:  
 
1. there is an information society service;  
2. that service consists in the storage of information, provided by the recipient of the service, at the request 
of that recipient;  
3. and (3) the provider of the service has no actual knowledge of the illegal nature of the information, or of 
facts which would make such illegality apparent, and duly acts to remove it upon becoming aware of its 
illegality.  
 
The Opinion of the Advocate General and the ruling of the Court reveal the argumentation of the plaintiffs, 
who relied on first two requirements for the application of Article 14, namely: (1) that the provision of search 
tools, including AdWords is not an information society service, and (2) that the storage of keywords selected by 
AdWords users cannot constitute hosting for the purposes of Article 14 of the directive.  
4.  AdWords as an information society service 
 
Article 1(2) of Directive 98/34 defines information society service as ‘any service normally provided for 
remuneration, at a distance, by electronic means and at the individual request of a recipient of services’. Annex 
5 to this directive lists examples of what is and what is not an information society service in detail. For instance, 
fax-based services are not considered to be delivered by electronic means, and hence outside the sphere of 
application of the Ecommerce Directive. In general, one can equate information society services with Internet-
based services or simply an e-commerce (Polanski (2008a)). 
 
In his Opinion, the Advocate General found nothing in the wording of the definition of information society 
services to exclude its application (Google opinion, para. 131). It is worth recalling though that a "complex"  
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legislative history of the directive, and the wording of article 21 of the Directive, which mandated the 
Commission with a task of examining the need of additional limitations on liability for other activities such as 
the provision of hyperlinks and search engines gave raise, in the AG's view to two possible interpretations: one  
including and one excluding search engines services from the scope of the directive. Mr Maduro then relied on 
article 1(5) of the directive, which has not explicitly excluded search engine service providers from the scope of 
the law, which led AG to the conclusion that such services fall under the sphere application of the directive on 
electronic commerce (Google Opinion, para. 136).  
 
The Court has also come to the conclusion that AdWords service features all of the elements of the 
information society service definition (Google case, para 110). In my view, this is a correct conclusion. Services 
provided by search engines are information society services and they are covered by the directive 2000/31/EC. 
Both the Court and the AG could perhaps support their argumentation with a reference to recital 18 of 
Ecommerce Directive, which explicitly provides that  
 
"…information society services are not solely restricted to services giving rise to on-line 
contracting but also, in so far as they represent an economic activity, extend to services which 
are not remunerated by those who receive them, such as (...) those providing tools allowing for 
search, access and retrieval of data." 
 
 The directive made it clear that it applies to the provision of services by search engines, even if such services 
are not remunerated by those who receive them. Consequently, information society services embrace both free 
Google search engine as well as AdWords service and therefore, cannot in principio be denied the access to safe 
haven provisions of the Ecommerce Directive.  
5. AdWords as a hosting service 
 
The main question remains whether Google's AdWords services can be classified as hosting under Article 14 of 
the directive on electronic commerce in a legal sense. In order to better understand the legal meaning of hosting 
let’s first recall the wording of opening sentence of Article 14 of the Directive titled Hosting: “Where an 
information society service is provided that consists of the storage of information provided by a recipient of the 
service (…)”. Hosting is understood as the storage of information provided by a user. The term ‘hosting’ was 
used twice in the text of the directive (in recital 18 and in the title of Article 14) but no definition is present.  
 
What is then hosting in a technical sense? Hosting is a service provided primarily by data centers that 
offer a 24/day access to a disk space to individuals and organizations, who want to make their available on the 
Internet. There are various levels of service and various kinds of additional services offered. The most common 
kind of hosting is web hosting, which typically includes a provision of free space on a remote server accessible 
via FTP protocol together with a variety of combined services, such as e-mail hosting service and DNS hosting. 
According to Wikipedia, full-featured hosting services include dedicated hosting service, virtual private server 
and collocation facilities: 
 
 “Dedicated hosting service, also called managed hosting service, where the hosting service 
provider owns and manages the machine, leasing full control to the client. Management of the 
server can include monitoring to ensure the server continues to work effectively, backup 
services, installation of security patches and various levels of technical support. Virtual private 
server, in which virtualization technology is employed in order to allow multiple logical servers 
to run on a single physical server. Colocation facilities, which provide just the Internet 
connection, uninterruptible power and climate control, but let the client do his own system 
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In all of the cases, hosting is restricted to management of technical infrastructure and not administration 
of content.  As a result, if hosting was to be interpreted in its technical sense, Article 14 exemption could not 
apply to AdWords service (Polanski 2009). 
 
The narrow interpretation of hosting is visible in the argumentation of plaintiffs. Trade mark rightholders 
raised the argument that hosting is a purely technical operation and by incorporating hosting into an advertising  
activity AdWords fell outside the purview of Article 14 (Google Opinion, para. 139). This is a strong argument 
because as we have seen above, hosting services were traditionally offered by data centers providing services of 
storage of files for the purpose of making them available at the request of a recipient of an Internet service 
(Polanski 2009). Justice Eady in Metropolitan International Schools Ltd v Designtechnica Corporation and  
Others argued that the characterization of Google search services (referring to natural search services) as hosting 
services should be rejected (MIS 2009). 
 
The broader understanding of hosting seems to prevail in the European Commission, although not without 
doubts. As the AG noted "the Commission itself has changed its opinion on the scope of Directive 2000/31, 
having argued in the present cases that the exemption provided for in Article 14 applies to AdWords." (Google 
Opinion, para. 135). This approach would be in line with the American approach where the equivalent provisions 
of DMCA were interpreted extensively to encompass services distributing third-party content (Bailey 2006, p. 
10). Similar lines of argumentation are presented in the British literature offering a wide interpretation of hosting 
exemption in the UK implementation of the Directive 2000/31/EC  (Holmes 2007, p. 339). 
5.1 AG’s rejection of a hosting defense 
 
The Advocate General noted that Google stores text of ads and their links at the request of its users, therefore 
nominally fulfilling the conditions for the application of Article 14 (Google Opinion, para 138). The Court also 
seems to have gone in this direction:  
 
"...it cannot be disputed that a referencing service provider (...) stores, that is to say, holds in 
memory on its server, certain data, such as the keywords selected by the advertiser, the 
advertising link and the accompanying commercial message, as well as the address of the 
advertiser’s site." (Google case, para. 111). The AG also added that: “(...) Information society 
services will rarely consist in activities which are exclusively technical, and will normally be 
associated with other activities which provide their financial support.” (Google Opinion, para. 
140).  
 
This short passage could be interpreted as equating hosting with an activity of a broader scope than a mere 
storage of data (Polanski 2009), effectively rejecting the idea that hosting should be limited to mere network 
storage services (Walden 2009). 
 
However, despite the apparent broad interpretation of storage requirement the Advocate General suggested to 
the Court that access to Article 14 safe haven should be denied to Google AdWords service: 
 
 “(...) The provider of the paid referencing service cannot be regarded as providing an 
information society service consisting in the storage of information (...)” (Google Opinion, 
answer 4).  
 
Before we analyze the position adopted by the European Court it is worth again to recall AG's argumentation:  
 
“(…) the present cases involve a particular advertising context which sets the hosting activity 
apart. That is the reason why I find myself in agreement with the trade mark proprietors – even 
if not automatically endorsing their arguments – that the liability exemption under Article 14 of 
Directive 2000/31 should not apply to AdWords. That position is based on the underlying aim 
of Article 14 and of Directive 2000/31 as a whole." (Google opinion, para. 141).  
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But what is the underlying aim of Article 14 in AG's viewpoint? It's the principle of neutrality, which is 
construed from Article 15 of Directive 2000/31/EC, which prevents Member States from imposing on ISPs, 
network, caching and hosting providers an obligation to monitor the information carried or hosted, or actively to 
verify its legality.  The AG noted: “I construe Article 15 of that directive not merely as imposing a negative  
obligation on Member States, but as the very expression of the principle that service providers which seek to 
benefit from a liability exemption should remain neutral as regards the information they carry or host.”  
 
Therefore, if it can be established that a given information society service provider does not modify or in any 
way influence the content it processes, he would fall under the sphere of application of Article 14 (Polanski 
2009). 
  
However, in the AG's viewpoint, Google does not remain neutral with respect to content it carries or hosts in 
AdWords service:  
 
"Google’s display of ads stems from its relationship with the advertisers. As a consequence, 
AdWords is no longer a neutral information vehicle: Google has a direct interest in internet 
users clicking on the ads’ links (as opposed to the natural results presented by the search 
engine)." (Google Opinion, para. 145) The question whether such liability exists is a matter for 
national law to determine. (Google Opinion, para. 146) 
 
It is to be regretted, though, that the AG has not further developed a "principle of neutrality" and the "direct 
interest" argument. Is the neutrality understood as a lack of financial incentives to influence the content carried 
or hosted? Or maybe the neutrality is used in the technical sense meaning that no manual intervention is present. 
If the latter interpretation is correct, one could argue that a pecuniary interest has nothing to do with technical 
neutrality with respect to the content stored. Firstly, a pecuniary interest is, in fact, one of the characteristics of 
information society services, which should normally be provided for remuneration. Consequently, in this context 
a direct interest in users clicking on the ads should not be the sole criterion for attributing liability for content 
stored. Secondly, it is hard to imagine how Google could deliberately resign from the technical neutrality with 
respect to the content stored. The fact that there is a much smaller number of hits within AdWords in comparison 
to natural search services does not mean that Google has an interest in manually influencing the display of 
advertisements as it could simply harm their business. The total number of paid advertisements is simply too big 
to control it manually and the greatest revenue comes from automatisation, and not from manual processing.  
 
The neutrality principle could also be understood as a lack of financial interest in the content stored (Walden 
2009). Traditional hosting service providers normally do not have an interest in the type or amount of content 
stored. Google, however, as the AG seems to argue - has a financial interest in the data stored (because 
advertisers pay for each advertisement). If that interpretation is correct, then the same argument as in the 
previous case can be raised, namely that information society services are normally offered for remuneration. 
Furthermore, one may wonder in this context what is the difference in terms of financial interest between Google 
who gets paid for each advertisement and a traditional hosting service provider that gets paid - for the sake of 
simplicity - for each gigabyte of hosting space offered. Is this a useful criterion for distinguishing information 
society services that fall under the sphere of application of Article 14 of the Directive, and those that fall 
outside? 
5.2 Court’s ruling 
 
The European Court of Justice has not explicitly endorsed the direct interest criterion advocated by Mr Maduro. 
Instead the Court has turned to the very basis of Article 14, namely to the assumption that exemptions from 
liability established in the Directive only apply to intermediaries, and not non-intermediaries. In the words of the 
Court: "(...) the conduct of that service provider should be limited to that of an ‘intermediary service provider’ 
within the meaning intended by the legislature in the context of Section 4 of that directive" (Google case, para 
112). It is therefore crucial to be able to find criteria to distinguish between those service providers that store  
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data at the request of the users and at the same time act as intermediaries from those who merely store third-party 
content.  
 
The Court found the criteria for distinguishing "protected" hosting intermediaries in recital 42 of the 
Ecommerce Directive, which "... cover only cases in which the activity of the information society service 
provider is ‘of a mere technical, automatic and passive nature’, which implies that that service provider ‘has 
neither knowledge of nor control over the information which is transmitted or stored’” (Google case, para. 113). 
Interestingly, this criterion is also an emanation of a principle of neutrality in its technical sense. As the Court 
made it clear, in order to be protected by liability limitations established in the Directive, 
 
 "it is necessary to examine whether the role played by that service provider is neutral, in the 
sense that its conduct is merely technical, automatic and passive, pointing to a lack of 
knowledge or control of the data which it stores." (Google case, para. 114) 
 
The task of determining whether the conduct of Google is of technical, automatic and passive nature was 
vested with national courts that will have to apply this ruling in the local settings. However, the Court has 
included certain positive and negative hints as to what control knowledge or control over data really means.  
 
Firstly, the ECJ pointed the fact that: the "...display of the ads is made under conditions which Google 
controls." (Google case, para. 115). Referring to the criteria outlined above this would suggest that Google does 
not fall under the Article 14 sphere of protection because it controls the conditions under which ads are 
displayed. However, the Court has made it clear that the mere control of conditions of access should not be 
equated with the control of the data: "...the mere facts that the referencing service (...) provides general 
information to its clients cannot have the effect of depriving Google of the exemptions from liability provided 
for in Directive 2000/31." (Google case, para. 116) 
 
Likewise, the Court clarified the fact that although Google controls the terms of payment, it does not mean 
that it should be denied the Article 14 shield. This statement rejects the principle of neutrality  which  is 
interpreted as a lack of financial interest in the data stored. Thirdly, the Court of Justice hints that it may be hard 
to attribute Google with a knowledge of or control over data due to or as a result of a "(...) concordance between 
the keyword selected and the search term entered by an internet user". (Google case, para. 117). 
 
However, the main task for the national court will be to examine "(...) the role played by Google in the 
drafting of the commercial message which accompanies the advertising link or in the establishment or selection 
of keywords is relevant." (Google case, para. 118). This is actually the heart of the problem as it may turn out 
that Google is not truly neutral in this area. It will be hard, anyway, to claim that Google could filter keywords 
corresponding to registered and unregistered trademarks, as there is no central database of such trademarks, and 
even if there was one, it would have to cope with the fact that intellectual property regimes are national in 
character. 
 
In summary, the Court has accepted under certain conditions the extension of the sphere of application of 
Article 14 to sponsored links services. This is an important verdict as many third-party content service providers 
will now be able to rely on the lack of knowledge or control over data argument to avoid legal liability.  
6. Conclusion 
 
Sponsored links services have been subject to litigations in several Member States, including: Austria, Belgium, 
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, albeit on different grounds (Google opinion, para. 14). 
Although especially French courts called into question the legality of AdWords services offered by Google, the 
Court has ruled that the most well-known search engine cannot be effectively accused of trademark infringement 
as the company does not "use" trademarks in its legal sense.  
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The advertiser, however, may be forced to change his or her marketing tactics, which may have a deep 
impact on the e-commerce advertising sector. 
 
The Court ruling also analyzed to possibility of applying Article 14 liability exemption to Google AdWords 
service. European judges made it clear that sponsored links services are information society services and that 
they may fall under the sphere of application of hosting liability safe haven provided that their activities are of 
technical, automatic and passive nature understood as a lack of knowledge or control over the data stored. This 
statement is yet to be applied by French courts that will have to establish whether Google AdWords service is 
really neutral and hence deserves a special legal treatment.  
 
Concluding, a widening of the sphere of application of Article 14 to "virtual" hosting services became a fact. 
On the other hand, a liberal application of hosting exemption to all instances of websites storing third-party 
content may cause problems, especially in jurisdictions that do not yet have notice-and-takedown provisions. 
Suddenly numerous website proprietors may apply for protection only because they offer some mechanisms for 
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